















	This	definition	is	often	endorsed	implicitly	rather	than	explicitly.	For	example,	the	current	efforts	to	create	parity	between	mental	and	physical	health	typically	aim	at	improving	access	to	treatment;	while	the	campaigns	promoting	‘mental	health	awareness’	often	mean	little	more	than	removing	the	stigma	around	mental	illness	and	starting	conversations	about	its	causes	such	as	stress.4		Underlying	the	intuitions	that	mental	health	is	largely	about	tackling	mental	illness	is	an	explicit	philosophical	position	and	it	exists	thanks	to	Christopher	Boorse’s	writings	from	1970s	onwards.	Boorse	is	well-known	for	his	so-called	biostatistical	theory,	which	identifies	health	with	normal	species	functioning.	One	statement	of	this	view	is	as	follows:		 An	organism	is	healthy	at	any	moment	in	proportion	as	it	is	not	diseased;	and	a	disease	is	a	type	of	internal	state	of	the	organism	which:	(i) Interferes	with	the	performance	of	some	natural	function	–	i.e.,	some	species-typical	contribution	to	survival	and	reproduction	–	characteristic	of	the	organism’s	age;	and	(ii) Is	not	simply	in	the	nature	of	the	species,	i.e.	is	either	atypical	of	the	species	or,	if	typical,	mainly	due	to	environmental	causes	(Boorse	1976,	62-63).		
	4	For	examples	of	this	in	the	English	context	see	“Valuing mental health equally with physical health 
or “Parity of Esteem””. London: NHS England. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/mentalhealth/parity/, and Mental Health Awareness Week by the Mental 




























sociologist	Marie	Jahoda	articulated	an	influential	and	perhaps	an	even	more	demanding	ideal,	encompassing	six	criteria:		 1. Self-acceptance	and	self-confidence	2. Self-actualization	3. Integration	of	different	psychological	functions	4. Autonomy	5. Accurate	perception	of	reality	6. Environmental	mastery	(Jahoda	1958).		Unlike	WHO	Jahoda	does	not	mention	work	and	community	contribution,	but	she	adds	the	truth	and	accuracy	requirement.	Her	goals	are	distinctly	humanistic.	She	wishes	to	move	beyond	the	emphasis	on	‘adjustment’	as	the	key	aspect	of	mental	health	in	the	tradition	of	Karl	Menninger	(Menninger	1930).	But	in	rejecting	this	identification	of	mental	health	with	social	acceptability,	she	introduces	an	individualistic	ideal	based	on	the	goals	of	excellence,	competence,	and	autonomy.		Today	positive	definitions	of	mental	health	have	taken	a	distinct	turn	inspired	by	positive	psychology.	They	have	grounded	mental	health	in	wellbeing,	flourishing,	and	happiness.	Scientists	in	this	tradition	refer	to	‘flourishing’,	‘mental	wealth	of	nations’	and	a	number	of	other	positive	concepts	that	describe	individuals’	psychological	resources.9	These	definitions	are	weaker	in	some	sense	but	
	9	Keyes	2002,	Beddington	et	al	2008,	Huppert	and	So	2013,	Stewart-Brown	2013.	
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stronger	in	another.	They	are	weaker	in	that	the	wellbeing	in	question	is	subjective	rather	than	objective,	but	stronger	in	articulating	specific	positive	emotions	such	as	happiness,	life	satisfaction,	or	sense	of	flourishing.			What	might	be	wrong	with	this?		
5.	Against	Demanding	Definitions	The	proposals	we	mentioned	above	differ	from	each	other	in	subtle	ways	and	should	ideally	be	examined	individually.	But	for	present	purposes	it	is	sufficient	to	identify	a	few	concerns.	Not	all	undermine	each	of	the	demanding	options	to	the	same	extent	but	together	they	nicely	illustrate	the	problem.		The	first	problem	is	medicalisation	of	unhappiness,	idleness,	dependence,	etc.	Setting	a	given	level	of	a	positive	good	as	a	condition	of	mental	health	turns	this	good	into	a	medical	category	when	it	was	not	previously	so.	Medicalisation	has	a	complex	history	where	progress	and	humanism	are	intertwined	with	use	of	medicine	for	control	and	oppression	(Conrad	2007).	Treating	substance	addiction	as	a	medical	problem	rather	than	a	moral	failing	is	a	positive	illustration,	but	it’s	far	less	clear	whether	the	failure	of	a	child	to	conform	to	the	modern	classroom	is	an	illness.	The	latter	worries	motivate	critics	of	the	modern	scale	of	medicalisation	who	point	out	that	extending	the	domain	of	psychiatry	actually	undermines	its	epistemic	and	moral	legitimacy	(Charland	2013).			It	is	not	clear	that	any	of	the	advocates	of	the	demanding	positive	definitions	are	aware	of	these	dangers.	Take	public	health	–	clearly	an	important	business	of	
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local	and	national	governments.	Political	theorists	of	all	stripes	agree	that	the	pursuit	of	this	business	carries	dangers	of	oppression	such	as	when	a	government-backed	ideal,	in	this	case	an	ideal	of	mental	health,	is	imposed	on	individuals	in	violation	of	their	autonomy	and	self-determination.	In	the	liberal	tradition	such	an	imposition	is	a	violation	of	the	much	valued	condition	of	neutrality,	but	other	intellectual	traditions,	such	as	the	critical	theory,	medicalisation	is	one	of	the	instruments	of	maintenance	and	reproduction	of	an	existing	social	order.		If	it	were	possible	to	formulate	a	non-oppressive	ideal	of	mental	health	(which	we	believe	is	possible),	the	intent	to	identify	it	with	wellbeing	or	the	good	life	raises	difficult	epistemic	and	conceptual	issues	regarding	which	notion	of	wellbeing	to	use	and	which	elements	to	incorporate	into	‘overall	wellbeing’.	Philosophers	and	social	scientists	typically	treat	wellbeing	as	an	inclusive	good,	encompassing	not	just	happiness,	but	also	goods	such	as	friendship,	love,	achievement,	sense	of	purpose,	etc.	How	to	weigh	these	goods	in	relation	to	each	other	is	surely	a	deeply	personal	matter,	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	a	defensible	recipe	exists	at	the	population	level	(Hausman	2015,	Alexandrova	2017).	It	is	precisely	this	problem	–	fitting	all	that	wellbeing	encompasses	in	one	valid	and	practical	measurement	procedure	–	which	motivates	recent	criticisms	of	wellbeing	interventions	in	public	health	such	as	the	one	articulated	by	England’s	Chief	Medical	Officer:		 After	reviewing	the	evidence	I	conclude	that	well-being	does	not	have	a	sufficiently	robust	evidence	base	commensurate	with	the	level	of	
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attention	and	funding	it	currently	receives	in	public	mental	health	at	national	and	local	government	level.	Well-being,	as	a	field	within	mental	health,	has	not	evidenced	an	acceptable	definition	or	set	of	metrics.	It	is	unclear	how	concepts	and	measures	that	do	exist	relate	to	populations	with	mental	illness(Davies	2014,	15).	
This	harsh	verdict	is	not	uncontested	(Huppert	and	Ruggeri	in	press)	and	the	measurement	of	wellbeing	remains	a	lively	project	in	the	social	and	medical	sciences.	However,	whether	measures	of	mental	health	should	be	identical	to	measures	of	wellbeing	is	and	should	be	controversial.		Where	does	this	leave	us?	The	negative	conception	is	not	positive	enough,	while	the	existing	positive	ones	are	too	positive,	so	to	speak.	Is	there	a	happy	medium?	We	submit	there	is,	namely	a	relatively	value-neutral	definition	of	mental	health	that	avoids	the	problems	associated	with	defining	mental	health	in	terms	of	wellbeing.	To	see	where		this	more	ecumenical	conception	lies	it	is	useful	to	analyse	how	it	differs	from	common	definitions	of	mental	health.	For	instance,	the	following	definition	by	the	Public	Health	Agency	of	Canada	is	a	fairly	typical	instance	of	how	mental	health	is	conceptualised	by	health	practitioners	and	within	public	policy:			 The	capacities	of	each	and	all	of	us	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	enhance	our	ability	to	enjoy	life	and	deal	with	the	challenges	we	face.	It	is	a	positive	sense	of	emotional	and	spiritual	wellbeing	that	respects	the	
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importance	of	culture,	equity,	social	justice,	interconnections,	and	personal	dignity.10	
How	does	our	definition	of	mental	health	differ	from	this	kind	of	conception?	We	wish	the	authors	had	stopped	after	the	promising	first	sentence	and	skipped	the	overly	grand	second	sentence	altogether.	What	if	we	identified	mental	health	not	with	wellbeing,	but	rather	with	those	psychological	capacities	that,	if	developed	and	maintained,	enable	individuals	to	pursue	any	conception	of	the	good	life	or	wellbeing,	whatever	conception	of	it	they	adopt?	In	the	following	section	we	flesh	out	the	idea	that	mental	health	is	a	precondition	of	wellbeing,	without	being	identical	to	wellbeing.	
6.	Mental	Health	as	a	Psychological	Primary	Good		Let	us	begin	with	that	first	sentence	from	the	Public	Health	Agency	of	Canada	definition,	which	takes	mental	health	to	consists	in	“the	capacities	of	each	and	all	of	us	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	enhance	our	ability	to	enjoy	life	and	deal	with	the	challenges	we	face.”		There	are	four	notable	features	of	this	one-sentence	definition,	which	we	will	briefly	consider	in	turn	before	formulating	our	more	general	definition	of	mental	health.								Firstly,	mental	health	concerns	our	capacities	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	certain	ways	that	enhance	our	ability	to	attain	certain	states	of	affairs.		It	is	not	defined	by	how	we	actually	feel,	think,	and	act,	or	by	what	we	actually	attain.		Already	
	10	https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/health-promotion/mental-health/mental-
health-promotion.html	
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these	qualifications	limit	the	scope	of	mental	health	in	a	liberal	direction.		This	has	much	in	common	with	the	“capabilities	approach”	towards	human	development	and	justice	(Nussbaum	2000;	Sen	1999).		According	to	the	capability	approach,	the	good	life	is	not	about	having	a	set	of	goods,	but	rather	about	having	a	set	of	valuable	capabilities.		Valuable	capabilities	include	freedoms	to	undertake	valuable	activities	(e.g.	holding	a	decent	job,	being	able	to	engage	in	politics,	being	able	to	spend	time	in	unspoilt	nature)	or	freedoms	to	enjoy	certain	states	of	being	(e.g.	being	healthy,	being	respected	for	one’s	religious	affiliation	or	sexual	orientation,	being	able	to	live	in	a	loving	family	and	a	supportive	social	network)	(Robeyns	2017).		The	advantage	of	focusing	on	capabilities	–	the	abilities,	skills,	and	opportunities	–	rather	than	actual	states	of	doing	and	being	is	that	people	remain	free	to	decide	whether,	and	how	best,	to	use	them.	Out	of	all	capabilities	our	definition	of	mental	health	will	be	grounded	in	the	psychological	ones	to	feel	and	to	think	and	we	shall	reserve	for	them	the	term	‘capacities’.		This	focus	on	human	capacities	also	coheres	with	George	Graham’s	definition	of	mental	disorder	(Graham	2013).		Graham	defines	mental	disorder	as	the	inability	to	develop	and	exercise	psychological	capacities	for	‘flourishing’,	which	he	further	defines	as	the	capacities	we	are	bound	to	need	no	matter	what	life	we	decide	to	pursue.		In	defining	mental	disorder	in	this	way,	Graham	is	drawing	explicitly	upon	John	Rawls’	notion	of	primary	goods	–	all-purpose	goods	that	people	need	whatever	their	plans.		According	to	Rawls,	liberal	states	should	provide	citizens	with	the	necessary	means	to	pursue	their	own	conceptions	of	the	good.		As	long	as	the	pursuit	of	one’s	own	conception	of	the	good	does	not	
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result	in	harm	to	others,	it	is	not	the	business	of	the	state	to	deem	whether	or	not	one’s	own	conception	of	the	good	is	worthwhile.		Although	Rawls	was	concerned	with	the	material	and	social	basis	for	primary	goods,	his	theory	can	be	extended	to	the	psychological	conditions	required	for	people	to	pursue	their	own	conceptions	of	the	good	life.		We	believe	this	way	of	defining	mental	health	is	useful	and	avoids	the	problems	associated	with	definitions	that	ground	mental	health	in	the	notion	of	wellbeing.											The	second	notable	feature	of	the	above	one-sentence	definition	of	mental	health	is	that	it	is	minimal.		Instead	of	a	long	list	of	capacities,	it	consists	in	two:	namely	the	ability	to	enjoy	life	and	to	deal	with	challenges	we	face.		These	capacities	are	broad	and	can	be	specified	in	a	number	of	ways.		For	reasons	of	liberal	neutrality,	we	consider	this	to	be	a	virtue	of	a	definition	of	mental	health	rather	than	a	vice.		Recall	that	the	Public	Health	Agency	of	Canada	definition	goes	on	to	specify	how	these	capacities	are	realised,	stating	that	mental	health	is	“a	positive	sense	of	emotional	and	spiritual	wellbeing	that	respects	the	importance	of	culture,	equity,	social	justice,	interconnections,	and	personal	dignity.”		We	can	see	how	outlining	the	breadth	of	mental	health	in	this	way	can	be	useful	–	showing	how	it	may	be	impacted	by	a	wide	range	of	conditions,	such	as	culture,	equity,	social	justice,	interconnections	and	personal	dignity.		But,	although	this	may	be	true	for	some	individuals,	it	may	not	be	the	case	for	others.		The	conditions	that	are	actually	required	for	people	to	enjoy	life	and	deal	with	challenges	they	face	is	largely	an	empirical	question	and	will	partly	be	determined	by	differences	in	personality,	age,	context	and	culture.																																		
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Thirdly,	the	above	definition	concerns	capacities	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	certain	ways.		This	emphasis	on	psychological	capacities	–	feeling,	thinking	and	acting	–	distinguishes	it	from	definitions	of	physical	health.		Definitions	of	physical	health	(positively	construed)	are	concerned	with	the	physiological	capacities	that	enhance	our	ability	to	enjoy	life	and	deal	with	the	challenges	we	face.		This	does	not	mean	to	say	there	aren’t	significant	areas	of	crossover	between	the	two	e.g.	diet,	exercise,	social	connection.		However,	we	believe	the	above	distinction	accounts	for	the	main	differences	between	physical	and	mental	health	treatment.																	Fourthly,	it	is	worth	noting	the	two	broad	capacities	that	mental	health	consists	in	according	to	the	above	definition:	a)	to	enjoy	life;	and	b)	to	deal	with	the	
challenges	we	face.		These	broad	capacities	get	to	the	heart	of	what	it	means	to	be	mentally	healthy.		However,	we	believe	they	can	be	even	more	broadly	construed	to	qualify	as	a	psychological	primary	good.	Firstly,	we	can	re-construe	the	ability	to	enjoy	life	as	the	ability	to	value	life	–	to	see	life	as	valuable	or	worth	living.		Not	everyone	needs	to	enjoy	life	to	pursue	their	own	conception	of	the	good	life.	However,	the	ability	to	value	life	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	wellbeing.	We	can	re-construe	the	second	capacity	in	a	similar	way.	The	ability	to	deal	with	the	challenges	we	face	is	an	important	component	of	the	wider	ability	to	engage	in	
life	–	to	pursue	the	things	in	life	that	seem	valuable	or	worthwhile,	despite	difficulties,	challenges,	setbacks,	failures,	losses,	and	so	on.				Although	these	capacities	come	in	degrees,	they	nonetheless	can	fall	above	or	below	certain	thresholds.		For	instance,	one	symptom	of	depression	is	that	patients	are	unable	to	see	value	in	themselves,	others,	or	their	environment.		
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Similarly,	patients	with	general	anxiety	disorder,	due	to	excessive	worry	and	anticipation	of	disaster,	may	be	unable	to	cope	with	various	demands	and	threats	concerning	the	things	they	care	about.		In	both	cases,	patients	can	be	viewed	as	slipping	below	a	certain	threshold	of	being	able	to	value	or	engage	in	life.																	On	the	basis	of	these	four	points,	we	can	offer	the	following	one-sentence	definition	of	mental	health	as,	‘the	capacities	of	each	and	all	of	us	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	enable	us	to	value	and	engage	in	life.’		In	the	next	section,	we’ll	outline	what	we	take	these	psychological	capacities	for	valuing	and	engagement	to	consist	in.		Note	that	we	only	offer	this	outline	as	a	way	of	clarifying	the	scope	of	this	relatively	neutral	definition	of	mental	health.		It	is	a	starting	point	for	a	full,	empirically-informed	account,	which	is	however	beyond	the	scope	of	this	article.		
7.	Towards	a	Broad	Definition	of	Mental	Health										We	maintain	that	mental	health	can	be	defined	as,	‘the	capacities	of	each	and	all	of	us	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	enable	us	to	value	and	engage	in	life.’		In	this	section,	we	will	expand	on	what	the	two	main	features	of	this	definition	–	valuing	life	and	engaging	in	life	–	consist	in.									Consider	valuing	life,	first.		We	take	this	to	consist	in	capacities	to	care	about	certain	states	of	affairs	–	features	of	ourselves,	others	and	our	environment.		When	you	value	something,	you	are	positively	disposed	towards	it	(in	a	psychological	sense)	in	various	ways	(Tiberius	2018).		For	example,	when	you	love	someone,	you	may	feel	a	sense	of	warmth	and	connection	around	them,	a	
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mild	form	of	separation	distress	when	they	leave,	be	motivated	to	care	for	them	and	look	out	for	their	wellbeing,	and	so	on.		This	is	different	to	merely	seeing	something	as	good	or	valuable	in	some	way.		Valuing,	in	addition,	involves	being	disposed	or	committed	to	seeing	something	as	valuable.		This	may	not	always	take	the	form	of	an	explicit	value	judgement	towards	that	thing	(i.e.	“I	value	x”	or	“I	believe	x	is	worthwhile”)	but	nonetheless	influences	how	you	consistently	feel,	think	and	act	in	relation	to	it	over	time.11				Our	capacities	to	value	certain	states	of	affairs	may	seem	relatively	straightforward	or	foundational,	but	they	still	need	to	be	developed,	and	may	remain	fragile	throughout	our	lives.		Psychopathy,	for	instance,	can	be	viewed	partly	as	an	inability	to	develop	certain	valuing	capacities,	in	particular	the	ability	to	value	the	wellbeing	of	others.		Alternatively,	individuals	may	lose	their	valuing	capacities,	as	can	be	the	case	with	depression,	or	during	extreme	cases	of	grief.		To	be	able	to	appreciate	life	is	foundational	to	our	sense	of	agency,	but	it	is	far	from	straightforward.		Valuing	certain	states	of	affairs	–	features	of	ourselves,	others,	and	our	environment	–	is	a	complex	endeavour,	which	may,	amongst	other	things,	require	the	presence	of	basic	goods,	such	as	pleasure,	loving	relationships,	moral	worth,	and	good	effects,	and	the	absence	of	their	opposites	(Smuts	2017).		
	11	Sometimes	we	may	consistently	see	something	as	valuable	without	valuing	it.		This	may	be	a	result	of	habit	or	compulsion,	as	is	often	the	case	with	addictive	behaviours.		In	such	cases,	individuals	may	not	identify	with	their	feelings	towards	an	addictive	substance	or	behaviour,	instead	seeing	them	as	alien	and	contrary	to	their	sense	of	agency.		They	may	feel	shame	towards	such	feelings,	pride	at	overcoming	them,	and	admiration	towards	others	who	manage	to	do	so.	
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Let	us	now	turn	to	the	second	part	of	our	proposed	definition	of	mental	health,	namely	engaging	in	life.		This	includes	the	ability	to	‘deal	with	challenges	we	face’,	as	emphasised	in	the	Public	Health	Agency	of	Canada	definition	above.		Again,	this	is	just	a	sketch,	but	we	take	engaging	in	life	to	at	least	partly	consist	in	the	capacities	that	make	up	psychological	flexibility.12		Psychological	flexibility	is	“the	ability	to	change	or	persist	in	behavior	when	doing	so	serves	valued	ends.”	(Hayes	et	al	2011)	In	the	pursuit	of	valued	ends,	we	often	come	across	difficulties,	challenges,	setbacks,	failures	and	losses.		In	response,	being	psychologically	flexible	enables	us	to	shift	our	perspective,	successfully	adapt	and	learn	from	our	situation.		This	may	either	result	in	changing	or	persisting	behaviour	depending	on	what	is	learned.		For	instance,	the	practice	of	mindfulness	often	involves	subjects	simply	paying	attention	to	their	sensations,	thoughts	and	feelings	–	neither	ignoring	them	nor	seeing	them	as	the	full	picture.		This	can	help	subjects	act	on	the	information	provided	by	those	sensations	without	engaging	in	habitual	patterns	of	meaning	and	behaviour.13							As	with	our	capacities	to	value	life,	our	capacities	for	engaging	in	life	also	need	to	be	developed,	and	may	remain	fragile	in	the	response	to	various	difficulties,	set-backs,	and	adversities.		Mental	disorders	such	as	depression	and	general	anxiety	disorders	often	involve	individuals	‘getting	stuck’	in	certain	ways	of	thinking,	feeling	and	acting.		We	may	often	be	able	to	pursue	our	values	through	the	formation	of	appropriate	goals	and	plans.		However,	when	things	inevitably	do	
	12	For	a	review,	see	Kashdan	&	Rottenberg	2010.	13	For	related	notions	to	psychological	flexibility,	see	De	Young	2015	on	the	personality	meta-traits	of	Stability	and	Plasticity,	and	McGilchrist	2012	on	the	divided	brain.				
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not	go	to	plan,	we	may	be	more	or	less	able	to	treat	our	situation	in	a	psychologically	flexible	manner.		Psychological	flexibility	involves	being	able	to	see	such	situations	as	providing	us	with	worthwhile	–	if	not	predominantly	negative	–	information.		We	may	use	this	information	to	form	new	goals	and	plans,	and	different	sets	of	skills,	habits	and	behaviours.		These	abilities	to	understand	and	act	within	any	given	situation,	or	within	any	area	of	life,	are	foundational	to	a	person’s	mental	health.																																				In	summary,	our	definition	of	mental	health	builds	upon	existing	positive	definitions	of	mental	health	while	stripping	them	down	to	their	foundations.	We	focus	on	people’s	basic	abilities	to	form	values	and	pursue	them	in	the	face	of	life’s	difficulties	and	challenges.		In	short,	we	suggest	that	mental	health	consists	in	people’s	basic	psychological	capacities	to	value	and	engage	in	life.	These	capacities	are	positive	psychological	features,	not	mere	absence	of	mental	illness,	but	they	are	not	sufficient	for	wellbeing.		The	definition	thus	offers	more	than	the	negative	one	and	less	than	the	utopian	ones.																															
7.	Objections	and	Replies	In	this	section,	we	will	consider	some	objections.		According	to	our	definition,	mental	health	concerns	the	capacities	of	each	and	all	of	us	to	feel,	think,	and	act	in	ways	that	enable	us	to	value	and	engage	in	life.		One	might	object	that	both	of	these	two	main	features	of	the	definition	-	valuing	life	and	engaging	in	life	–	are	problematic	notions.						
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Consider,	first,	the	notion	of	valuing	life.		One	might	object	that	our	definition	of	valuing	life	does	not	consist	in	capacities	for	valuing	things	that	are	actually	valuable.		For	example,	according	to	our	definition,	someone	might	qualify	as	being	mentally	healthy	even	if	they	value	things	that	do	not	make	them	better	off,	such	as	fame	and	fortune.		This	is	problematic	insofar	as	mental	health	is	typically	viewed	as	something	of	value,	either	in	an	intrinsic	or	instrumental	sense	(Raibley	2012).		Why	should	we	care	about	people’s	mental	health	if	it	consists	in	people	valuing	things	that	do	not	contribute	towards	their	wellbeing?									In	response,	we	believe	we	should	embrace	the	potential	for	mentally	healthy	individuals	to	develop	values	and	conceptions	of	the	good	life	that	may	not	in	fact	be	good	for	them.		Thus,	according	to	our	definition,	mental	health	is	a	
necessary	but	not	sufficient	precondition	for	wellbeing.		Wellbeing	requires	not	merely	the	ability	to	value	certain	states	of	affairs,	but	rather	the	ability	to	value	states	of	affairs	that	are	good	for	us.		Instead	of	viewing	this	as	a	weakness	of	our	definition,	we	take	it	to	be	a	strength.		In	contrast	to	the	notion	of	wellbeing	which	is	defined	relative	to	some	substantive	good	such	as	pleasure,	success	or	flourishing,	the	concept	of	mental	health	makes	reference	only	to	valuing	and	engagement	and	these	capacities	are	neutral	with	respect	to	the	precise	conception	of	wellbeing	that	an	individual	may	adopt.	We	hope,	or	rather	it's	an	empirical	bet	we	are	making,	that	whether	one	is	a	hedonist,	an	Aristotelian	or	a	desire	theorist,	certain	capacities	are	fundamental.	That	these	capacities	are,	as	
29	 		
we	outlined	above,	is	empirical	matter	we	want	science	or	medicine	to	answer.14	This	is	not	to	say	that	our	definition	is	purely	descriptive.	What	it	takes	to	value	and	to	engage	may	well	require	value	judgments	(for	instance,	about	what	counts	as	a	normal	setback	versus	an	insurmountable	obstacle	that	people	should	not	be	expected	to	overcome),	but	these	judgments	are	less	contentious	than	judgments	about	nature	of	wellbeing.				Thus	our	definition	of	mental	health	steers	clear	of	normative	judgments	about	what	is	good	for	us	and	how	we	ought	to	live.		Mental	health	consists	in	being	able	to	value	certain	features	of	ourselves,	others	and	our	environment,	rather	than	certain	features	we	should	value	according	to	any	particular	prudential,	moral	or	religious	theory.																										The	second	objection	relates	to	the	notion	of	engaging	in	life.		The	ability	of	individuals	to	effectively	pursue	the	things	they	value	requires	a	range	of	attentional,	emotional	and	cognitive	capacities	(Bratman	2018,	Holton	2008,	Mele	1997).		In	contrast,	our	definition	of	mental	health	only	consists	in	the	broad	capacities	that	make	up	psychological	flexibility	–	the	ability	to	change	or	persist	in	behavior	when	doing	so	serves	valued	ends.		One	might	object	that	this	definition	is	relatively	uninformative.				
	14	It	is	possible	that	empirical	findings	will	reveal	that	there	is	no	single	set	of	psychological	capacities	that	underlie	all	the	plausible	conceptions	of	wellbeing.	This	is	a	possibility	that	we	should	certainly	allow	for,	but	equally	ours	is	a	justifiable	bet.	
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In	response,	although	it	is	tempting	to	expand	this	list	of	capacities	to	include	other	psychological	capacities	(in	particular	those	related	to	the	formation	and	maintenance	of	social	relationships),	we	want	to	resist	this	move.		A	more	expansive	list	may	include	the	kinds	of	psychological	capacities	outlined	in	Jahoda’s	definition	of	mental	health	discussed	above	–	things	such	as	self-acceptance	and	self-confidence,	self-actualization,	autonomy,	and	environmental	mastery	(Jahoda	1958).		However,	we	have	argued	that	these	more	demanding	definitions	of	mental	health	are	problematic	in	various	ways.		In	order	to	remain	as	value-neutral	as	possible,	our	definition	of	mental	health	consists	in	broad	psychological	capacities	which	can	then	be	further	specified,	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	in	accordance	with	a	particular	individual’s	values,	and	other,	more	general,	factors	such	as	their	personality,	age,	context	and	culture.																										The	result	is	a	definition	of	mental	health	that	views	mental	health	as	a	necessary	(but	not	sufficient)	precondition	for	wellbeing.		Moreover,	it	leaves	considerable	room	for	empirical	work	to	flesh	out	what	mental	health	consists	in	for	different	cultures,	groups,	personalities,	ages,	etc.,	and	clinical	work	to	determine	the	specific	capacities	that	impact	the	mental	health	of	any	given	individual.		Being	able	to	value	and	engage	with	life	is	likely	to	consist	in	a	complex	range	of	attentional,	emotional	and	cognitive	capacities	that	will	vary	considerably	by	context.		Nonetheless,	our	definition	of	mental	health	provides	a	rough	outline	of	the	broad	kinds	of	psychological	capacities	that	matter	and	why.																	
8.	Looking	ahead	
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We	have	argued	that	there	exists	a	happy	medium	between	the	insufficiently	and	the	overly	demanding	definitions	of	mental	health.	Our	definition	has	the	following	features:		
l It	is	positive	rather	than	negative	because	in	addition	to	absence	of	disease	we	specify	a	further	requirement.	
l It	is	grounded	in	wellbeing	without	identifying	mental	health	with	wellbeing.	
l It	is	politically	legitimate	or	at	least	has	a	better	chance	of	being	so	than	the	more	demanding	definitions.	
By	way	of	conclusion	we	wish	to	raise	two	issues	we	have	not	discussed	in	this	paper	but	that	may	well	be	affected	by	our	proposal.	Firstly,	the	issue	of	measurement.	It	is	a	live	controversy	which	scales,	questionnaires	and	indicators	best	capture	mental	health.	One	popular	scale	for	measuring	‘mental	well-being’	is	the	Warwick	and	Edinburgh	Mental	Well-being	Scale	which	asks	people	to	judge	the	extent	to	which	they	feel	optimistic,	effective,	useful,	relaxed,	able	to	get	along	with	other	people	and	to	make	up	their	mind	about	things	(Stewart-Brown	and	Janmohamed	2008).	Although	it	has	the	word	‘well-being’	in	it,	in	fact	it	measures	people’s	own	sense	of	their	personal	effectiveness	for	going	through	with	basics	of	life.	There	is	a	difference	between	this	sense	of	personal	effectiveness	on	the	one	hand,	and	subjective	wellbeing	on	the	other.	Intuitively	the	latter	refers	to	our	emotional	wellbeing,	our	happiness,	our	fullness	of	heart,	joy	and	contentment.	Feeling	happy	takes	more	than	just	patting	yourself	on	the	back	for	being	effective.	Quite	possibly	this	scale	captures	our	definition	
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reasonably	well,	but	this	is	ultimately	a	question	for	a	proper	psychometric	investigation.15		The	second	issue	is	which	interventions	support	mental	health	on	our	definition.	This	is	of	course	an	empirical	question.		However,	it	seems	likely	that	mental	health	as	a	precondition	of	wellbeing	would	need	more	than	medication	and	talk	therapy.	The	development	and	the	maintenance	of	the	relevant	psychological	skills	calls	for	interventions	at	social	rather	than	individual	levels,	anticipating	structural	obstacles	to	exercise	of	agency	such	as	gender	norms,	racial	and	class	discrimination,	and	generally	aim	at	empowerment,	rather	than	only	treatment	and	prevention.			 	
	15	Böhnke	and	Croudace	2016	raise	significant	worries	about	validity	of	all	the	existing	measures	of	positive	mental	health.	
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